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Women’s role in the military has grown rapidly.  Using standard data sets and a special survey of reservists, 
female veterans are found to have better earnings endowments than nonveterans.  Although female veterans 
have higher unadjusted earnings than nonveterans, a wage disadvantage is found for white but not nonwhite 
veterans following control for measured and unmeasured skills.  Low returns to military service may result 
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In the past two decades the representation of women in the U.S. military, as in other areas of the 
labor force, has grown dramatically, rising from only 1.9 percent of the enlisted force in 1973 to nearly 11 
percent in 1990 (Binkin, 1993).  Women’s role in the military is likely to expand even further as legal and 
non-legal obstacles that have prevented their serving in certain military occupations, especially combat 
specialties, are gradually removed (Presidential Commission, 1992; Schmitt, 1994).  Changes in the utilization 
and occupational assignment of women will also likely be accompanied by an increased number of female 
recruits (Eitelberg, 1993).  Consequently, the stock of female veterans in the civilian population, which by 
1991 had reached 1.1 million (Department of Labor, 1992), also will grow.  Despite the numerous and far-
reaching changes in the opportunities for women in the military, the civilian labor market experiences of 
female veterans has not received attention in previous research. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the civilian labor market performance of women veterans. 
 Our primary analysis uses a unique data set that deals with the special circumstances surrounding the 
enlistment and occupational assignment of women.  The Reserve Components Survey (RCS) (Defense 
Manpower Data Center, 1987a; 1987b) provide data on veteran and nonveteran reservists, a population 
whose members are more alike in numerous respects than a randomly selected sample of the civilian labor 
force.  The survey's sample design controls for numerous background factors that affect individual enlistment 
behavior and that previously have not been measured.  In addition to the RCS, we use standard labor market 
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to 
examine veteran earnings. 
The attractiveness of the RCS, as compared to the CPS and NLSY, stems from the expectation that 
selection into the military based on unmeasured characteristics is a particularly important factor bearing on 
female military participation.  From the standpoint of the armed forces, the number of women allowed to 
enter the military has always been constrained by demand limitations.  From the standpoint of potential 
recruits, the military constitutes a nontraditional occupation for women.  Hence, controlling for the selection 
process may be more important for analyses of female veterans’ earnings than it is for males.  
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Although prior research on the civilian earnings of veterans has been extensive, covering both the 
volunteer era and periods when conscription was used, the literature has concentrated almost exclusively on 
men.1  To analyze veterans who served during conscription periods, researchers have used various labor 
market surveys, including the CPS, the Census, and the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men.  For 
the volunteer era, which began in 1973, most prior studies have relied on the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY) (see Bryant and Wilhite, 1990; Phillips, et al., 1992; Bryant et al., 1993).  Because of 
differences between women and men in self-selection, military demand restrictions, and occupational 
assignment, the experiences of males may not provide a reliable guide to the effects of military service on 
females. 
A study by Mangum and Ball (1989; see also, 1987) is one of the few even to have included female 
veterans.  The authors use the NLSY to examine the determinants of the transfer of military and other types 
of training, and the effect of skill transfer, veteran status, and post-school training on the annual earnings and 
hourly wages of men and women volunteer-era veterans.  For women, the authors find that military training 
is less likely than various types of civilian training to be transferred to civilian jobs.  Measures of military 
service – a veteran status dummy and time spent in the military – are statistically insignificant in explaining 
women’s hourly wages.  
Although Mangum and Ball offer preliminary evidence on the earnings of female veterans, further 
research is clearly warranted.  Although two-thirds of all female veterans served during the pre-volunteer 
era (Cohany, 1990), Mangum and Ball must focus only on the volunteer period because of the young sample 
in the NLSY.  A further drawback of the NLSY is that only a small number of female veterans from this 
period is available for analysis.  Small sample sizes are likely to account for their estimated veteran status 
coefficient of 0.427 for women, implying a 53 percent wage premium for veteran women as compared to 
similar nonveteran women.  Despite the magnitude of this coefficient, it is not statistically significant.2  
Finally, their estimates do not account for potential bias from selection effects, a potentially important issue 
                    
1 Mangum and Ball (1989) provide a brief survey of this literature.  More recently, Angrist (1990) has addressed in some 
detail selectivity issues using information on date of birth for veteran and nonveteran birth cohorts affected by the draft 
lottery in the late Vietnam period (1970-1972). 
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when examining occupational assignment, skill transfer, and earnings.3  In the present study, the Current 
Population Survey and the Reserve Components Survey are used because they offer relatively large samples 
of female veterans and because they provide data on veterans from both draft and volunteer periods.  The 
design of the RCS, moreover, provides a natural control for important types of selectivity. 
The next section of this paper analyzes the reserve survey, as well as providing supplementary 
evidence from the NLSY.  This is followed by a similar analysis of female veteran and nonveteran earnings 
utilizing data from the CPS. 
The Reserve Components Survey: Background and Results 
The 1986 Reserve Components Survey (RCS) sampled 60,120 officer and enlisted reservists.4  Most 
reservists hold full-time civilian jobs and attend reserve drills for one weekend per month and for two weeks 
during the summer to train in their specialty.5  What makes the reserves a fertile ground for investigating 
veterans’ earnings is that members are divided between those who have prior active-duty service and those 
who do not; that is, some reservists are veterans and some are not.6  Furthermore, the RCS data provide 
implicit controls for both program selection by the military and self-selection by individuals. 
Self-selection arises in veteran-nonveteran earnings studies because recruits have chosen the 
military over other alternatives; in addition, veterans represent members of the regular military who have 
chosen to separate at the expiration of their term of service.  Both of these choices may hinge on 
unmeasured characteristics.  Censoring also occurs because veterans must meet fairly stringent physical, 
                                                                                 
2 Their wage equation does not control for part-time status, a particularly important wage determinant among women 
(nonveteran women are more likely to work part-time than are veterans). 
3 Bryant et al. (1993) apply the Heckman correction to male, all-volunteer era veterans, but find no evidence of selection 
bias after controlling for AFQT and attitudes toward military service in their wage equation.  Angrist (1990) provides a 
particularly careful treatment of selectivity issues. 
4 The 1986 Reserve Components Survey: Selected Reserve Officer and Enlisted Personnel (RCS) was conducted by the 
Department of Defense to assess a wide range of manpower issues and personnel policies.  The population of the basic 
samples consisted of trained selected reservists.  Surveys were administered to approximately 109,000 reservists.  The 
population of reservists in 1986 was 1.1 million (U.S. Department of Defense, 1987).  The member population was 
stratified by reserve component, reserve category, enlisted status, and sex; within most strata, the design provided for a 
10 percent sample.  The questionnaires were administered at reserve units during March and April 1986.  The response 
rate for enlisted personnel was 59.7 percent, yielding usable responses for 60,120 persons.  
5 The average reservist spent 15.5 days in 1985 on reserve duty (mostly for training purposes) and received $2,420 in 
reserve earnings.  Civilian income averaged $17,197 in 1985.  A more extensive description of the compensation and 
labor force status of reservists in the RCS can be found in Grissmer et al. (1989). 
6 The legal definition of a veteran is one who has served at least 24 consecutive months on active duty in the regular 
military (U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs, 1989).  Reservists who meet this criterion are defined as veterans; reservists 
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mental, and moral standards to qualify for enlistment, and a different set of standards (e.g., job performance) 
to be eligible for reenlistment.  Because of the limited number of military jobs available to female recruits, 
censoring at the enlistment point is particularly important for women.  If the factors that explain why some 
women enlist, and why some subsequently separate, are also correlated with earnings, selectivity may bias 
estimates of veteran status on civilian earnings. 
The RCS data provide important controls for the unmeasured heterogeneity that can bias earnings 
studies.  Since entrance standards for both reserve and active duty are the same, all RCS respondents are 
qualified to serve on active duty.  These entrance standards are based largely on mental ability tests (AFQT), 
education, moral background (criminal record, drug use, etc.), and physical or medical tests.7 Hence, 
differences in these important personal characteristics for the reserve population – veterans and nonveterans 
alike – are minimized.  This contrasts to a random sample of the civilian population in which assignment to 
the treatment and control groups (i.e., veterans and nonveterans) is based partly on these characteristics, but 
they typically are not observed by the researcher.  
A related source of selection bias is controlled in the RCS because of the similar preferences or 
positive military propensity shared by all reservists.  In a random sample, preferences and alternative 
opportunities are major unobservables that explain why most otherwise qualified youth do not attempt to join 
the military.  In sum, the comparison group design adopted here matches veterans with nonveterans who are 
similar in crucial respects, except for active-duty service.  By controlling for many of the unobserved pre-
treatment taste and ability factors that account for the non-random assignment of the eligible population to 
the treatment and control groups, the data may yield more precise estimates of the economic return to 
military service.8 
Several considerations bear on the civilian earnings potential of female veterans.  Women have not 
only increased their representation in the military, they also have made dramatic inroads into nontraditional 
military occupations.  The proportion of military women in “non- traditional” broad occupation categories 
                                                                                 
who do not are classified as nonveterans. 
7 Although the AFQT is required of reservists, test scores are not reported in the RCS. 
8 In this regard, the RCS shares some features with samples of siblings and twins that have been used in estimating the 
returns to education.  
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increased from only 9.4 percent in 1972 to 45.0 percent in 1984, a six-fold increase (Eitelberg, 1988).  
Compared to their civilian counterparts, military women are now much more heavily represented in the 
nontraditional broad occupational categories of “electrical/repair,” “communications/intelligence,” and 
“electrical/mechanical.”  Conversely, military women are far less likely than civilian women to be working in 
traditional “functional support” jobs (Firestone, 1992).  As a result of these differences, military women may 
acquire advanced skill training, some of which is general in nature and transferable to civilian employers.  If 
skill acquisition differs significantly between nonveterans and veterans, female veterans may reap positive 
benefits from military service.  
These gains are limited by the extent to which veterans’ skills are nontransferable to civilian jobs, 
either because they are military-specific, or because nontraditional civilian jobs for which veterans are trained 
either remain closed to women or are not sought out by female veterans.  Differences in civilian earnings 
may also result if female veterans have different attachment to the labor force than their nonveteran civilian 
peers.  Finally, it has been shown that military experience for men is often not a good substitute for civilian 
job experience (Trost and Warner, 1979).  Because of the importance of continuous job tenure to earnings, 
both male and female veterans may suffer an earnings penalty associated with job change, especially if 
occupational change is involved.  This penalty may be less evident for veteran women than for men, 
however, since short or discontinuous tenure is somewhat more likely among civilian women (the comparison 
group for female veterans) than among men.9 
To estimate veteran-nonveteran wage differentials among women, earnings functions are specified 
using the log of hourly earnings as the dependent variable.  The RCS data are restricted to enlisted reservists 
who worked in paid civilian jobs.  Observations with missing (and in a few cases implausible) values for any 
of the variables used in the analysis also were deleted.  These restrictions resulted in a usable sample of 
1,946 women, of whom 25.4 percent were veterans.  Variables that most directly capture general human 
capital include years of education, potential work force experience, and potential experience squared.  
                    
9 There has been much debate on the relationship between tenure and earnings.  For a summary of this debate, see 
Hutchens (1989); a recent contribution to this literature is Brown and Light (1992).  The RCS provides no information on 
tenure in the civilian job, or type and length of active-duty military training among veteran reservists. 
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Current labor force status was reflected in dummy variables for part-time status, government employment, 
and broad occupation and industry (one-digit census codes) categories.  Demographic variables representing 
marital status (married, spouse present=1) and number of children are also included in the specification. 
Separate log wage equations are estimated for veteran and nonveteran female civilian workers.  This 
approach does not constrain the labor market rewards to other worker characteristics to be equal for 
veterans and nonveterans.  We subsequently estimate veteran- nonveteran wage differentials by race and 
for the draft and volunteer eras.  For the 1986 population of reservist-veterans, enlistment dates coincide with 
the volunteer period (post- 1973) for respondents who are 30 and under.  The draft-era sample is restricted 
to those over age 30 and the volunteer era sample to those 30 and under.  It is unknown whether the 
earnings potential of female veterans will differ according to era of service.  On the one hand, women have 
always been volunteers, even during conscription, and differences in enlistment behavior during the two eras 
may be slight.  On the other hand, differences may arise because the most recent draft period included the 
Vietnam War and enlistment motives may differ between a draft/wartime period versus the 
volunteer/peacetime period.  
The issue of minority representation in the armed forces continues to be heatedly debated.  In 1989, 
racial and ethnic minorities accounted for 29 percent of the enlisted force, roughly twice their percentage in 
the civilian population (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1990).  A number of reasons have been 
advanced to explain why military service may augment the productivity of nonwhites more than whites.  
These include the argument that the military may be a more effective mechanism for nonwhites to make the 
transition from school to the civilian workforce – the “bridging hypothesis” (Fredland and Little, 1985); that 
the general training and skills received in the military are more valuable to nonwhites; and that military 
service provides a more effective “screen” to employers.  To account for these possible differences, 
earnings differences are estimated for nonwhites and whites. 
Table 1 presents RCS variable means and regression estimates based on separate wage equations 
for female veterans and nonveterans of all eras and races.  Consistent with the belief that selectivity is 
important, there are notable differences between the population of female reservists and the overall female 
 7
labor force (compare the means in Table 1 with nonveteran means from the CPS presented in Table 4).  In 
the RCS sample, the proportions of women who are nonwhite and work for the public sector are more than 
twice as high for reservists as for civilian women in general.  Conversely, female reservists are only half as 
likely to work part time as are other female civilians and are far less likely to be married.  Nonveteran 
reservists have less education and potential experience than veteran reservists and are more likely to be 
nonwhite. 
Among the notable results evident in Table 1 are relatively small schooling coefficients and steep 
wage-experience profiles both among veteran and nonveteran reservists.  Schooling coefficients are low in 
part because occupational controls are included (hence schooling coefficients represent intra-occupational 
returns and exclude the broad occupational mobility or access provided by schooling), and in part because of 
the relatively high degree of homogeneity among the reservist population (i.e., included are disproportionate 
numbers of high-ability low-schooling and low-ability high-schooling workers) that lessens wage differentials 
associated with years of schooling.  
The estimated effect of experience for female reservists is much closer to that of males than of 
females in the largely nonreservist civilian labor force.  For example, the experience- earnings profile for 
veterans in Table 1 is almost identical to that estimated for males by Mangum and Ball (1989, Table 2, p. 
239).  In contrast, the experience-earnings profile for females in the Mangum-Ball study is essentially flat, 
while subsequent results reported here from the CPS indicate an experience profile with an initial slope (at 
EXP = 0) just half of that among reservists.  This difference between reservists and nonreservists may be 
due to the differences in characteristics noted above, especially the higher labor force participation of female 
reservists.  While the labor force participation rate in 1986 for females in the CPS is almost identical for 
veterans and nonveterans at 54.7 percent (Roca, 1986), the rate for female reservists in the RCS is 82.5 
percent.  A majority of reservists, however, are single and ages 25-34.  The participation rate for this 
demographic group in the civilian sector in 1986 was 81.1 percent, virtually identical to that of reservists 
(U.S. Department of Labor, 1988). 
The RCS results presented in Table 1 are used in turn to decompose the total veteran- nonveteran 
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log wage gap into an “endowment” effect and “coefficient” effect.  Let the superscripts v and n index 
veteran and nonveteran, â represent regression coefficients, and lnW and independent variables X represent 
means.  The total or unadjusted wage gap, (lnWv-lnWn), is decomposed into the log wage difference owing 
to differences in measured characteristics, referred to as the endowment effect, and differences in 
coefficients, referred to as the coefficient effect.  The endowment effect Óân(Xv-Xn) is computed by 
assuming the nonveteran wage structure applies to both groups of workers; the coefficient effect ÓXv(âv-ân) 
represents the unexplained or adjusted veteran-nonveteran wage differential.  Although this decomposition is 
not unique, the choice of nonveteran coefficient weights is appropriate here since female veterans comprise 
a tiny part of the labor force and the nonveteran coefficients represent the prevailing market wage structure 
(for a discussion of appropriate weights, see Neumark, 1988).  In Table 2, the total log wage gap is shown in 
column 1, the endowment effect in column 2, and the adjusted gap or coefficient effect in column 3.  As 
discussed below, results are presented not only from the RCS, but also from the NLSY and CPS. 
The unadjusted veteran log wage differential among reservists is small, about a 2½ percent 
disadvantage.  As shown in column 2, however, female veterans possess larger stocks of human capital and 
other characteristics than do nonveterans and might be expected to display a roughly 6½ percent wage 
advantage were they paid according to the nonveteran wage structure.  The coefficient effect (column 3 of 
Table 2), representing the wage differential after accounting for measured characteristics, indicates a 
sizeable wage penalty of about 8½ percent.10  In work not shown, we find a particularly large endowment 
advantage and large adjusted wage disadvantage among white veteran reservists, whereas nonwhite 
veterans have a relatively small endowment advantage and almost no adjusted wage disadvantage in 
comparison to their nonveteran counterparts.  We will subsequently return to other results in Table 2 using 
the NLSY and CPS. 
In Table 3, we provide estimates of adjusted wage differentials from pooled veteran- nonveteran 
samples, with coefficients on veteran dummy variables or appropriate dummy interaction variables serving as 
differential measures.  Distinct veteran-nonveteran differentials are estimated by race, schooling group, era 
                    
10 Logarithmic wage differentials are converted to percentage differentials by the approximation, [exp(á)-1]100, where á is 
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(the draft versus volunteer eras), and race by era.  Estimates are highly similar to comparable estimates of 
the coefficient effect obtained from separate wage equations.  The pooled estimates in Table 3 have the 
advantage of greater efficiency, since sample sizes of sub-groups are relatively small. 
The coefficient of the veteran status dummy variable in line 1 of Table 3 indicates a female veteran 
wage disadvantage of approximately 9 percent.  In line 2, however, where estimates of the differential are 
allowed to vary by race, we find a veteran penalty of about 12 percent for white women, as compared to 
about 2 percent for nonwhites.  It seems clear that the relative performance of nonwhite female veterans in 
the civilian labor market is far less negative than among white veterans. 
When veteran wage differentials are examined by schooling group, as shown in line 3, women with 
high school diplomas (or less) and those with some college (but not degree) experience an almost identical 
wage penalty of 10 percent.  The differential for college graduates, however, is considerably less negative, 
and statistically insignificant.  The veteran wage penalty by era, shown in line 4, suggests more negative 
wage outcomes for veterans during the draft than the AVF era (recall that women were not drafted during 
either period).  Further disaggregation by race (line 5) indicates that white females suffered similarly large 
veteran wage penalties during both eras, whereas coefficients among nonwhites are considerably smaller 
during both periods.11 
This paper argues that the RCS data are superior to random surveys in terms of controlling for 
unobserved factors that affect both enlistment and separation (i.e., veteran status) and earnings.12  To 
provide a basis for examining this claim, veteran-nonveteran wage differentials are also computed using data 
from the NLSY and, in the next section, the CPS.  In the NLSY, samples are not randomly assigned to 
                                                                                 
the log differential.  For a comparison of alternative approximations, see Giles (1982). 
11 In results not shown, we added to the wage equation dummies measuring the reserve component.  Although there are 
differences in earnings by reserve component (reservists in Navy and Air Force units had higher earnings than those in 
Army and Marine Corps units), estimated veteran-nonveteran differentials are affected little.  The VET coefficient 
changed from -.093 without component dummies to -.096 following their inclusion. 
12 There may be systematic differences between veterans who choose or are eligible to join the reserves and those who 
do not join or are not eligible to join.  This implies that our results for reservists cannot automatically be generalized to 
the non-reserve population.  We believe the RCS provides the preferred measure of the true veteran status effect, 
however, since the RCS controls for what in the CPS are substantial unmeasured differences between the non-reservist 
veteran and nonveteran populations.  Although the RCS controls for many background factors, some differences 
between veterans and nonveterans may remain unobserved.  For instance, reservist veterans have previously chosen a 
full-time military lifestyle that involved leaving the home area, whereas reservist nonveterans chose a less disruptive, 
part-time military affiliation.  Indeed, reserve participation is often viewed as equivalent to moonlighting (Grissmer et al., 
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treatment and control (i.e., veteran and nonveteran) groups but, rather, are determined based on taste and 
ability differences.  The direction of the potential bias is unknown, although if AFQT scores and previously 
measured endowments are positively correlated, the adjusted differential (the coefficient effect) should 
decrease following control for AFQT.  The NLSY for 1984 is used for this comparison as this was the last 
year that the large sample of armed forces members (originally interviewed in 1979) were in the survey.  
Even though the 1984 panel provided the largest sample of veterans in the NLSY, observations on only 191 
female veterans are available.  The specification is similar to that used for the RCS and, subsequently, the 
CPS.13 
Table 2 presents estimated wage differentials computed from the NLSY. Due to the young age of 
the NLSY respondents in 1984, these results should be compared to the RCS (and CPS) results for the 
volunteer era (in Table 3, line 4).  Note that AFQT scores are available in the NLSY to provide a partial 
control for military selection standards.  The wage models are estimated with and without AFQT to 
determine how the presence of the control influences the measured wage effect of veteran status.  
Differences in the NLSY results with and without controlling for AFQT indicate positive selection into the 
military.  That is, the adjusted veteran-nonveteran wage differential changes from slightly positive to slightly 
negative following control for AFQT.  This is consistent with the relatively stringent enlistment standards for 
women throughout the volunteer period.  The NLSY result without AFQT is close to zero, similar to that 
obtained with the CPS (.011 versus .007).  Comparison of the NLSY results with those from the RCS, 
however, suggest that AFQT scores provide only a partial control for selectivity, based most likely on military 
entrance standards, whereas the RCS data provide controls for self-selection as well as administrator 
selection. 
                                                                                 
1989).  
13 The NLSY provides information on reserve status, but in 1984 there were only 36 female reservists, 23 of whom were 
veterans.  We explored the possibility of estimating Heckman-Lee selection models with the NLSY, as done previously 
by Bryant et al. (1993) for males.  Among the 191 women veterans in our NLSY sample, however, 164 had an enlistment 
year prior to 1979 (this results from the NLSY design of an initial oversample of active-duty military).  Hence, information 
on such things as attitude toward serving in the military and local area unemployment at the time of enlistment are not 
available.   In work not shown, we included a measure of attitude toward military service (in 1984) in the wage equation.  
The variable was not significant and did not affect other coefficients. 
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Evidence from the Current Population Survey 
Further evidence is presented on the civilian earnings of female veterans and nonveterans, based on 
Current Population Surveys (CPS) for 1989-93.  The CPS provides information on large representative 
samples of U.S. households.  The CPS has not been used previously to examine the relative earnings of 
female veterans, owing in part to the fact that the CPS did not begin the regular recording of women's 
veteran status until the 1989 surveys, and in part because of the very small sample sizes of female veterans 
in each monthly public use survey.  Our sample is constructed from the 60 monthly Current Population 
Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) files between January 1989 and December 1993.  Each 
ORG file comprises the quarter sample of the CPS that is asked the earnings supplement questions (e.g., 
weekly earnings, hours worked, and union status).  The CPS ORG “earnings microdata files” are not public 
use files, but are made available by the Data Services Group at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  
The CPS ORG files are well suited for providing evidence on civilian earnings differences among 
relatively large and representative samples of the U.S. female (and male) veteran and nonveteran 
populations.  Wage differentials can be measured unadjusted for wage correlates other than veteran status, 
or estimated conditional on measured individual and labor market characteristics.  The major disadvantage of 
the CPS is that it is not well suited to control for selectivity, or unmeasured quality and taste differences 
between veterans and nonveterans.  This contrasts with the RCS, which controls for both military selection 
and self- selection by comparing veteran and nonveteran reservists, and the NLSY, which partially controls 
for both types of selectivity through the inclusion of AFQT scores.  If there exists positive selection among 
female veterans, as suggested in the previous section, we would expect the CPS evidence on earnings to 
appear more favorable toward veterans than does evidence from the RCS and NLSY (with control for 
AFQT). 
The CPS sample includes all employed female wage and salary workers ages 20 and over with 
positive weekly earnings and hours, whose principal activity during the survey week was not school.  Of the 
total sample of 402,883 women, 4,229 (1 percent) are veterans.14  We measure the wage rate by usual 
                    
14 In the CPS, reservists cannot be identified (they are a relatively small proportion of the total sample) and are included 
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weekly earnings divided by usual hours worked per week, in December 1993 dollars.  The unadjusted 
veteran-nonveteran logarithmic wage differential is 0.0628 indicating a 6.5 percentage wage advantage for 
female veterans relative to nonveterans. 
The Appendix provides descriptive evidence for five-year birth cohorts on the percentage veteran, 
average wages by veteran status, mean years of schooling by veteran status, and percentage nonwhite by 
veteran status.  The top panel of the table provides information for women.  For purposes of comparison, the 
bottom panel contains the same information for men (the sample for men has been constructed identically to 
that for women).  The percentage veteran is below 1 percent for all older female cohorts, except for the 
cohort born prior to 1930, which includes WWII-era veterans.  The 1955-59 and 1960-64 cohorts have a 
somewhat higher percentage veteran, reflecting the increased participation of women in the military.  As 
expected, the 1965-73 cohort has a relatively small number of female veterans who were out of the military, 
out of school, and in the civilian labor force by 1989-93.  Average wage differences largely mirror 
differences in mean years of schooling.  There is a wage advantage to most earlier cohorts of female 
veterans, corresponding to a schooling advantage of about one year.  Recent cohorts of female veterans, 
however, have schooling and wage rates similar to their nonveteran counterparts.  Just as is the case for 
males, nonwhites are underrepresented in the military among older cohorts, while being overrepresented 
among younger cohorts. 
Table 4 provides CPS sample means and regression coefficients from separate log wage equations 
for female veterans and nonveterans.  Control variables are listed at the bottom of Table 4.  Veterans have 
an approximate half year advantage in mean schooling, and small advantages in the proportion union 
members and proportion full-time.  Veterans, however, have less experience and are less likely to reside in 
large metropolitan areas.  A notable difference in mean characteristics is the greater proportion of veterans 
in relatively highly rewarded federal government and postal service jobs.  Note that hiring preferences for 
veterans in these sectors account in part for these employment differences.  One might argue, therefore, that 
inclusion of the public sector dummies biases downward estimates of the total effect of veteran status on 
                                                                                 
in both the veteran and nonveteran samples.  Individuals in the CPS are classified as veterans if they previously served 
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earnings (estimates of the veteran-nonveteran differential are about .01 higher when these are excluded).  A 
notable difference in parameter estimates is that veteran coefficients on the marriage variables are close to 
zero, as opposed to positive marriage coefficients of about .05 for nonveterans (a similar difference in 
coefficients is seen in the RCS sample).  Overall, most regression coefficients from the CPS sample are 
broadly similar to those obtained from the RCS.  
The difference in veteran and nonveteran log wages in the CPS is decomposed into that portion 
explained by different endowments or characteristics (weighted by the nonveteran earnings structure), and 
that portion owing to differences in coefficients (evaluated using veteran means).  These results are 
presented in Table 2, where they can be compared to results obtained previously using the RCS and NLSY. 
The veteran log wage advantage of .0628 can be accounted for almost entirely by differences in measured 
characteristics, the endowment effect being .0556.  The unexplained veteran-nonveteran difference is only 
.0072.  Although not the focus of this paper, we note that an identical analysis for men reveals a larger 
unadjusted veteran log wage advantage (.1317), but one which is also accounted for by measured 
characteristics, in particular the higher average age (experience) among male veterans than nonveterans (the 
endowment effect is .1501 and unexplained difference -.0184).  
As evident in Table 2, the CPS results for women are similar to the NLSY results excluding the 
AFQT measure.  They differ substantially but in a predictable way with results from the RCS.  Whereas the 
RCS (and the NLSY with AFQT included) show a wage disadvantage for female veterans relative to 
nonveterans, the CPS results indicate, on average, little wage difference between veterans and nonveterans. 
We believe an important reason for these differences is that selectivity bias is more serious in the CPS, given 
the absence of an explicit quality measure such as AFQT, or natural controls for unobservables such as that 
present in the sample of reservists.  In the RCS, CPS, and NLSY data sets, female veterans have superior 
measured earnings endowments as compared to their nonveteran counterparts.  Estimates of endowment 
effects are .06 log points in each of the three data sets (or .09 in the NLSY with AFQT included). 
Table 3 provides alternative estimates of veteran-nonveteran differences from the RCS and CPS, 
                                                                                 
in the active-duty military.  
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based on pooled equations with appropriate interaction terms.  To compare the CPS results for females to 
those for men, the right-hand side of the table provides equivalent estimates for males.  The data source, time 
period, and sample selection criteria are identical for women and men. 
CPS regression results using a veteran dummy variable (Table 3, line 1) indicate a difference of, 
essentially, zero (.0071), nearly identical to the previous result of .0072 (Table 2) based on separate veteran 
and nonveteran equations.  Qualitative differences in female veteran premiums based on race and education 
are reasonably similar between the CPS and RCS surveys.  In line 2 of Table 3, separate estimates are 
provided by race.  Whereas we find no significant difference in earnings between white veterans and 
nonveterans (.001) in the CPS, there is a small (.038) premium realized by nonwhite veterans relative to their 
nonveteran counterparts.  The qualitative evidence on racial differences, therefore, is similar in the RCS and 
CPS samples.  The suggestion from the data is that in contrast to whites, nonwhite veterans possess an 
unobserved productivity advantage relative to nonwhite nonveterans.  We cannot discern from the data the 
source of the differential.  This productivity advantage may be the result of selectivity by the armed forces, 
such that nonwhite recruits place higher in the ability distribution among the nonwhite population than do 
white recruits among the overall white population, or it may result directly from a relatively greater 
enhancement of skills acquired in military service by nonwhites than by whites.  We suspect both are 
important sources of racial differences in veteran-nonveteran wage differences.  Because we obtain a 
similar racial pattern of results in the RCS and CPS, even though the reservists sample already controls to 
some extent for military selection, we lean toward the latter explanation. 
The pattern of veteran wage differentials with respect to schooling are found to be similar in both the 
CPS and RCS.  In the CPS, veteran-nonveteran differences are estimated to be .000, .001, and .026 for 
civilian workers with no more than a high school diploma, with some college, and with a college degree, 
respectively.  While women with some college and those with a high school education or less realize similar 
differentials, wage differentials are higher among college graduates (.05 less negative in the RCS and .03 
more positive in the CPS).  A similar pattern with respect to schooling is found among CPS males.  Our 
schooling breakdown, which does not separate out workers with less than a high school diploma (among 
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recent cohorts, very few women or men who have not completed high school are admitted into the military) 
masks the traditionally high returns to military service found for older, less- educated males (see Berger and 
Hirsch, 1983, for evidence).  A compelling explanation for a more favorable veteran-nonveteran 
performance by college graduates is not readily evident.  One possibility is that educational benefits provided 
to veterans permit them to make economically desirable but otherwise liquidity-constrained investments in 
schooling.  Recent evidence by Angrist (1993) from the 1987 Survey of Veterans indicates that veteran 
benefits increase schooling levels by an average 1.4 years, with benefits accruing primarily to those attending 
college and graduate school.  Returns to years of schooling following service are not found by Angrist to be 
particularly high (about 4.3 percent a year), however, resulting in an earnings increase of about 6 percent. 
We next examine differences in veteran-nonveteran differences among women likely to have served 
during the draft and AVF eras.  Differences in the veteran differential by time period of service are small 
and insignificant, reflecting, perhaps not surprisingly, little effect of the draft on women.  It is important to 
note that with data covering a short time span (5 years for the CPS), we cannot distinguish between the 
effects of draft versus volunteer-era service, birth cohort, and age.  In work not shown, we find little 
difference in female veteran- nonveteran wage differentia ls when these are estimated separately either by 
10-year birth cohorts or age groups.  In fact, we had expected to find a veteran wage disadvantage for 
young women (below age 30) who are making the transition from military to civilian work, coupled with a 
steeper wage profile as catch-up takes place.  Note that such a pattern of initially depressed earnings but 
faster wage growth is typical of the previous evidence (Berger and Hirsch, 1983) reported for male veterans 
(and confirmed by us in results not shown).  The literature on male veterans suggests that this pattern 
reflects some combination of age, cohort, draft-era, and year effects. 
Conclusions  
Despite considerable attention and the increasing importance of women in the military, there exists 
little scholarly evidence on the relative civilian earnings of female veterans.  This paper provides what we 
hope is a valuable step in that direction.  Data from the 1986 Reserve Components Survey (RCS), the 1989-
93 Current Population Survey (CPS), and the 1984 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) have 
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been used to estimate veteran-nonveteran civilian wage differentials.  Our principal analysis has focused on 
the RCS, which provides a natural control for unobserved preferences and abilities since selection criteria 
and tastes are similar among individuals serving in the active-duty military and the reserves. 
The evidence from all three data sets indicates that female veterans possess a higher level of 
measured earnings endowments than do nonveterans.  Moreover, evidence from the RCS and NLS is 
consistent with the hypothesis that ability and other wage determinants unobservable in the CPS are 
positively correlated with measured endowments.  In the RCS, sizable veteran wage disadvantages are 
evident among white women following controls for measurable wage determinants.  In both the RCS and 
CPS, veteran-nonveteran wage differentials are more favorable among nonwhites than among whites, and 
among college graduates than among those without a college degree.  Our main results offer little support for 
the contention that military service provides work experience for women that is of superior value to that 
available in the civilian labor market.  Under the most favorable estimates from the CPS, time spent in 
military service by white women has a value equivalent to time spent in the civilian labor market.  
The postmilitary earnings experience of female veterans is important for at least two reasons.  First, 
the recruitment of highly qualified personnel depends partly on the expectation and promise that military 
training provides a valuable bridge to subsequent civilian jobs.  Second, the current military drawdown has 
been accompanied by a number of programs from the Departments of Defense and Labor to assist the 
transition of veterans to the civilian labor force.  Our evidence indicates that the military historically has not 
provided to women training that is equally valued to that received in the civilian sector.  The current military 
drawdown is likely to have exacerbated this problem, since personnel are being discharged who in the past 
would have chosen to make the military their career.  
The low returns to military service may reflect the restricted range of military occupations (prior to 
the mid-1980s) in which women were able to serve, the narrow opportunities for skill enhancement within the 
military, training that is nontransferable to civilian jobs, and an inability to transfer these skills to the civilian 
sector owing to occupational barriers to women in jobs utilizing these skills.15  Because of improved military 
                    
15 The military and civilian occupations and industries in which women are employed differ from those of nonveterans.  
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opportunities for women within the last 5-10 years, however, it is important to keep our results in perspective. 
 Moreover, substantial changes are currently underway.  In the future, enhanced military opportunities for 
women, coupled with declining sex segregation in the civilian labor market, should produce more favorable 
civilian performance outcomes for female veterans.  
                                                                                 
To some extent, the military may provide a mechanism by which women can gain training and subsequent entry to 
nontraditional civilian jobs to which they might otherwise be excluded.  We find some evidence along these lines.  
When we estimate a log earnings equation from the CPS excluding occupation and industry dummies, the veteran 
differential increases from .007 to .024.  Although both coefficients are small, the direction of change suggests that 
veteran status may provide access to women to occupations and industries that are somewhat higher paying than those 
obtained by otherwise similar nonveterans. 
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Regressions for Separate Veteran and Nonveteran Log Wage Equations from the RCS Data 







Diff. Coeff. (s.e.) 
 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Education 13.636 13.312 (3.54) .039 (.012) 
 
.036 (.009) 
Experience 11.953 10.619 (3.74) .029 (.012)  .032 (.007) 
Exper2/100 1.903 1.601 (2.86) -.058 (.034)  -.044 (.023) 
Married .357 .317 (1.65) .017 (.045)  .022 (.032) 
Nonwhite .288 .401 (-4.43) .134 (.046)  -.001 (.030) 
Part-time .096 .124 (-1.54) -.230 (.071)  -.139 (.044) 
Children .743 .669 (1.41) -.036 (.023)  .005 (.016) 
Public .525 .443 (3.21) .051 (.066)  .069 (.046) 
Industry (8)     yes  yes 
Occupation (7)    yes  yes 
R2    .235  .180 
N 495 1,451   495  1,451 
       
 
Data source is the 1986 Reserve Component Survey (RCS).  The dependent variable is the log of the wage, 
calculated by weekly earnings divided by weekly hours worked, with a mean of 2.005 for veterans and 2.030 
for nonveterans. Included in each equation are variables measuring years of schooling completed; potential 
experience and its square; and dummies equal to one if currently married, nonwhite, part-time, numb er of 
children, public sector worker, and dummies for broad industry and occupation (the number of included 
dummies is in parentheses).  t  Diff are t-ratios testing for equality of means; (s.e.) are the standard errors 












Effect F N 
RCS: 1986      
  All Women -.0248 .0642 -.0891 (1.501) 1,946 
NLSY (Volunteer      
  Era, All Women):      
  1984      
  Without AFQT .0755 .0645 .0109 (1.564) 1,159 
  With AFQT .0755 .0874 -.0118 (1.605) 1,106 
CPS: 1989-93      
  All Women .0628 .0556 .0072 (2.595) 402,883 
  All Men .1317 .1501 -.0184 (23.115) 426,936 
      
 
All calculations are based on separate log wage equations for veterans and nonveterans.  
The RCS results are based on coefficient estimates shown in Table 1, those for the CPS 
women on estimates shown in Table 4, and those for CPS men on estimates from a 
specification identical to that for CPS women.  The NLSY wage equations include variables 
identical to those in the RCS equation, with the exception that actual work experience is 
substituted for potential experience, and AFQT is included in one of the specifications.  The 
log wage gap is the unadjusted difference in the means of the log wage.  The endowment 
effect is the wage differential that would be observed were veterans and nonveterans 
rewarded similarly for measured characteristics; it is measured by the sum of the differences 
in explanatory variables times the nonveteran coefficients.  The coefficient effect or adjusted 
differential reflects wage differences following control for measured characteristics, and is 
measured by the sum of the differences in coefficients times the veteran means.  F is the F-
statistic testing the null that the coefficient effect is zero.  N is the sample size.  See the text 




Regression Estimates of Veteran-Nonveteran Wage Differentials by Race, School Group, and 








1.  VET -.0926 (.0271) 0.0071 (.0062) -.0160 (.0016) 
2.  WH*VET -.1262 (.0327) 0.0009 (.0068) -.0164 (.0017) 
     NW*VET -.0198 (.0580) 0.0382 (.0153) -.0131 (.0046) 
3.  VET*SCH<=12 -.1058 (.0399) 0.0001 (.0101) -.0173 (.0021) 
     VET*SCH13-15 -.1012 (.0406) 0.0011 (.0121) -.0269 (.0032) 
     VET*SCH16+ -.0472 (.0575) 0.0263 (.0130) -.0072 (.0030) 
4.  VET*DRAFT -.1221 (.0390) 0.0143 (.0096) -.0102 (.0019) 
     VET*AVF -.0690 (.0351) 0.0020 (.0082) -.0296 (.0028) 
5.  WH*VET*DRAFT -.1378 (.0450) 0.0092 (.0102) -.0103 (.0020) 
     NW*VET*DRAFT -.0883 (.0716) 0.0534 (.0283) -.0095 (.0054) 
     WH*VET*AVF -.1171 (.0427) -0.0056 (.0091) -.0317 (.0031) 
     NW*VET*AVF .0269 (.0603) 0.0320 (.0181) -.0171 (.0074) 
     N 1,946 402,883 426,936 
    
 
Shown are regression coefficients (standard errors) attaching to dummy variables reflecting 
veteran status and interactions of veteran status with race, schooling group, era, and race by era. 
 
RCS sample:  Dependent variable is log of hourly earnings, based on usual weekly earnings 
(excluding reserve pay) divided by hours worked per week.  Also included in all equations are 
years of schooling completed, potential experience and its square, currently married, nonwhite, 
part-time, number of children, public sector worker, and dummies for broad industry and 
occupation. 
 
CPS sample:  Dependent variable is log of real hourly earnings, in December 1993 dollars, based 
on usual weekly earnings (excluding reserve pay) divided by hours worked per week.  Also 
included in all equations are years of schooling completed, potential experience and its square, 
married spouse present, ever married but spouse not present, union membership, nonwhite, part-
time, number of children in primary family, federal (exc. postal), state, local, postal, and large 
metropolitan area. Also included are dummies for Census region, broad industry, broad 




Variable Means and Regression Results for Separate Female Veteran and 
Nonveteran Log Wage Equations from the CPS 









Diff. Coeff. (s.e.) 
 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Education 13.603 13.201 (10.25) .051 (.0038) 
 
.055 (.0003) 
Experience 20.166 20.819 (-3.36) .016 (.0022)  .016 (.0189) 
Exper2/100 5.392 5.922 (-5.27) -.026 (.0041)  -.026 (.0004) 
Married, w/ spouse 0.529 0.586 (-7.36) -.021 (.0194)  .056 (.0020) 
Ever Married w/o Spouse 0.291 0.212 (12.47) -.001 (.0202)  .045 (.0023) 
Union 0.149 0.135 (2.64) .210 (.0201)  .150 (.0021) 
Nonwhite 0.166 0.149 (3.04) -.009 (.0181)  -.041 (.0019) 
Part-time 0.210 0.236 (-3.99) -.099 (.0173)  -.130 (.0016) 
Children 0.786 0.736 (3.12) -.014 (.0071)  -.008 (.0007) 
Federal 0.101 0.024 (31.95) .040 (.0289)  .048 (.0048) 
State 0.074 0.053 (5.96) -.039 (.0296)  -.030 (.0033) 
Local 0.097 0.125 (-5.42) -.082 (.0254)  -.088 (.0024) 
Postal 0.022 0.006 (12.43) .152 (.0545)  .131 (.0087) 
Large CMSA/MSA 0.395 0.453 (-7.57) .091 (.0140)  .122 (.0014) 
Region (8)    yes  yes 
Industry (5)    yes  yes 
Occupation (13)    yes  yes 
Year (4)    yes  yes 
R2    yes  yes 
N 4,229 398,654  4,229  398,654 
       
 
Data source is the Current Population Survey for 1989-93.  Dependent variable is log of real wage rate.  The mean 
of the dependent variable is 2.2869 for veterans and 2.2241 for nonveterans.  Included variables are years of 
schooling completed, potential experience and its square, married spouse present, ever married but spouse not 
present, union membership, nonwhite, part-time, number of children in primary family, federal (exc. postal), state, 
local, postal, and large metropolitan area. Also included are dummies for Census region, broad industry, broad 
occupation, and year (the number of included dummies is listed in parentheses).  t  Diff. are t-ratios testing for 





Female and Male Veteran Status, Wages, Schooling, and Race, by Birth Cohort, 
1989-93 CPS 
Birth 
Cohort N VET Wv Wn Wv/Wn Sv Sn Sv-Sn NWv NWn 
Females:           
< 1930 19,230 1.17 13.66 9.19 1.49 13.69 12.05 1.64 3.11 12.05 
1930-34 20,110 0.87 13.21 10.48 1.26 13.48 12.45 1.03 5.71 13.19 
1935-39 27,541 0.89 12.31 10.78 1.14 13.49 12.73 0.75 11.02 14.38 
1940-44 38,158 0.80 14.31 11.37 1.26 13.93 13.09 0.84 9.87 14.26 
1945-49 50,972 0.91 12.59 11.78 1.07 14.15 13.42 0.73 12.96 14.62 
1950-54 58,242 1.07 12.27 11.70 1.05 14.27 13.50 0.77 17.57 15.87 
1955-59 62,025 1.42 11.27 11.34 0.99 13.68 13.42 0.26 19.13 16.35 
1960-64 60,611 1.35 10.14 10.55 0.96 13.07 13.45 -0.38 23.11 15.54 
1965-73 65,994 0.75 8.25 8.40 0.98 12.85 13.17 -0.31 20.61 14.56 
All 402,883 1.05 11.48 10.66 1.08 13.60 13.20 0.40 16.62 14.95 
Males:           
< 1930 19,171 67.22 14.45 12.81 1.13 12.89 11.31 1.59 7.30 17.53 
1930-34 22,688 64.01 16.52 14.65 1.13 13.12 11.66 1.46 7.80 17.59 
1935-39 29,837 48.39 17.02 16.09 1.06 13.26 12.50 0.75 7.75 15.14 
1940-44 39,423 40.29 17.36 16.74 1.04 13.49 13.09 0.40 8.46 14.83 
1945-49 51,400 43.76 16.70 16.86 0.99 13.67 13.66 0.01 8.95 14.39 
1950-54 60,113 22.26 14.82 15.85 0.93 13.31 13.69 -0.38 11.76 13.25 
1955-59 67,193 12.98 13.21 14.46 0.91 12.98 13.37 -0.39 15.29 12.33 
1960-64 67,214 10.51 11.42 12.52 0.91 12.69 13.19 -0.50 14.60 12.13 
1965-73 69,897 6.27 9.14 9.22 0.99 12.47 12.65 -0.18 13.79 12.87 
All 426,936 26.65 15.45 13.64 1.13 13.23 13.11 0.12 9.75 13.30 
           
 
N is the CPS sample size, VET is the percentage veteran, W v and W n are the mean wages in December 1993 dollars for veterans and 
nonveterans, Sv and W n are mean years of schooling for veterans and nonveterans, and NW v and NWn are the percentages 
nonwhite among veterans and nonveterans.  Wage ratios and schooling differences are calculated prior to rounding.  Birth cohort 
(year born) is estimated based on reported age in the CPS. 
 
 
